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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
SONYA L. ATKINSON, 
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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appellate Case No. 991029-CA 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Article VIII, Section 5 of the Utah 
State Constitution and Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3) and §78-2a-3(2). This case was assigned 
to the Court of Appeals by the Utah Supreme Court on February 11, 2000 pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2-2(4). 
1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented on appeal are the following: 
I. Viewing the facts and inferences from the facts in the light most 
favorable to Plaintiff, are there material issues of fact precluding summary judgment? 
Standard of Review: The Court of Appeals views the facts and inferences from 
the facts in a light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was entered, 
and reviews legal conclusions of the trial court for correctness. United Park City Mines Co. 
v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993); Christensen v. Burns International 
Security Service, 844 P.2d 992, 993 (Utah App. 1992). "Correctness" means no deference 
is given to the trial court's rulings on questions of law. State of Utah v. Pena, 869 P.2d 936 
(Utah 1994). Entitlement to summary judgment is such a question of law for which no 
deference is due the trial court's determination. Higgins v. Salt Lake County. 855 P.2d 231, 
235 (Utah 1993). Summary judgment can only be granted where there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure; Estate Landscape and Snow Removal Specialist Inc. v. Mountain States 
Telephone and Telegraph Co., 790 P.2d 415 (Utah App. 1990). 
Reference to Record Showing Preservation of Issue: See. Plaintiff's 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
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EL Did the trial court, the Honorable L. A. Dever, err in granting 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment based on its finding that these Defendants 
had no duty to protect the Plaintiff? (Summary Judgment [^2; trial transcript pg. 607). 
Standard of Review: The existence of a duty is a question of law, which this 
Court reviews for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's conclusion. First 
Security Bank v. Creech, 858 P.2d 958 (Utah 1993); CP. v. Martinez. 845 P.2d 246, 247 
(Utah 1992). Facts are to be reviewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. All 
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the facts are likewise viewed in a light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion. Baldwin v. Burton. 850 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1993). 
The burden is on the movant to show that reasonable inferences from undisputed facts do not 
support the opposing party's theory. Mathis v. Swanson. 413 P.2d 662 (Wash. 1966); 
Elliermerv.Kite. 625 P.2d 1006 (Colo. 1981). 
Reference to Record Showing Preservation of Issue: See. Plaintiffs 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is determinative of the issue on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a final judgement entered in the Third Judicial District Court, 
Tooele County, State Of Utah, Judge L.A. Dever presiding. 
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A. Nature of the Case. This appeal is from an Order issued by the Third 
District Court in and for Tooele County, State of Utah, on February 3, 1999, which granted 
summary judgment to Defendants Stateline Hotel Casino & Resort, Franklin T. Gammon, O. Lee 
Singleton, and Billy R. Rodd, which Order became final and appealable when the lower court 
entered its Order of Dismissal of December 6, 1999, dismissing the remaining Defendant, Jay 
Owens, from the action. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
1. Appellant, Sonya Atkinson, (hereinafter referred to as "Plaintiff'), her husband, 
and her friends went to Wendover, Nevada on April 8, 1995 and obtained lodging at the 
Westerner Motel (Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
(hereinafter "Defendants' Memo") % 1, pg. 2; trial transcript pg. 381; Plaintiff s Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
(hereinafter "Plaintiffs Memo") | 1 , pg. 2; trial transcript pg. 553). 
2. The group went to the Stateline Hotel Casino & Resort (hereinafter "Stateline") 
between 8:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. (Defendants' Memo f6, pg. 3; trial transcript pg.381; 
Plaintiffs Memo f 2, pg. 2; trial transcript pg. 553-554). 
3. Between approximately 9:00 p.m. and the alleged event, Plaintiff consumed 
large amounts of alcohol. Much of the alcohol was gratuitously served by the Stateline. 
(Plaintiffs Memo f4, pg. 2; trial transcript pg. 553; Defendants' Memo f7, pg. 4; trial 
transcript pg. 379). 
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4. Plaintiff watched a show at the Stateline. After the show, Plaintiff stopped at 
some slot machines where she met her attacker, 
Menu ). 
5. Stateline security officer Singleton reported and testified that he had seen the 
Plaintiff with Jay Owens at the Stateline's Double Down Bar about an hour befoic 
incident in a passionate embrace and kissing K- mgleton Deposition at 67-68). 
Plaintiff and Jay Owens were never at the Double Down Bar. (Owens Depo. at 20-21). 
(Plaintiffs Memo ]f6, p. 3; trial transcript pg. 552). 
f Defendants, in their Memo, allege that Plaui* 
quantities the Stateline1: 
APPROX1MAIE TIMi AMUUx% > ^ XOHOL DEFENDANT'S 
Prior to 8:00 p.m. 
8:00 p.m. - 9:00 p.m. 
9:00 p.w i ' mi midnight 
12:00 midnight - 1:00 a.m. 
1:00 a.m.-2:00 a.m. 
2:00 a.m. - 4:00 a.m. 
4:00 a.m. - 1 M) a.m. 
1 or 2 beers 
1 or more beers 
10 mixed drinks 
2 mixed drinks 
Unknown amounts of 
champagne, 2 or 3 shots of 
Tequila, 1 mixed drink 
6 or 7 mixed drinks 
1 ...-. 
MEMO REFERENCE 
11". uid V 
14 
17 
18 
1f9andfl0 
112 
117 
1
 The emphasized time periods anil .fit i 4Mel ",» M 
the Stateline to Plaintiff 
""i "v i'" 11" (i"<'» "»ided gratuitously by 
(Trial transcript pgs. 370-381). 
8. Plaintiff went to the Show Bar at the Stateline at approximately 4:00 a.m. The 
Stateline bartender, in his statement to police, stated: "[although they [Plaintiff and Mr. 
Owens] had obviously been drinking he seemed OK so I served them". (Plaintiffs Memo 
f9, pg. 4; trial transcript pg. 672). 
9. Plaintiff was taken from the Show Bar by Stateline security officers, Mr. 
Gammon and Mr. Rodd. At that time, Mr. Gammon and Mr. Rodd took Plaintiff to the 
Stateline security office. Mr. Gammon and Mr. Rodd testified that Plaintiff kept going 
"limp" during the walk to the security office and that they both were required to assist 
Plaintiff in getting there. (Defendants' Memo %28, pg. 16; trial transcription pg. 367). 
(Emphasis added). 
10. Stateline security officers testified in their depositions that Plaintiff was 
intoxicated and incoherent while she was in their custody. "Q. Was she saying something 
when she was being carried in? A. Just a bunch of mumble-jumble, jibberish." (Robbdepo. 
at 47). 
Q. So I guess what I'm trying to understand, you say a question 
was asked, then a lengthy discussion of a couple minutes took 
place between her and the John Doe before any kind of response 
to that question came back? 
A. Right. She [Plaintiff] did not want to answer anything we 
asked her. John Doe would have to get her to talk to us in order 
to - because - well, his statement to me was, please don't arrest 
her. I can take care of her. (Singleton depo. at 41). (Emphasis 
added). 
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But I was trying my best to get information and 1 could 
any information. (Gammon depo. at 24). 
A. But I was - 1 was like sitting - 1 was actually kneeling and 
trying to talk to her [Plaintiff) and John Doe was sitting right 
there holding her hand, and I was trying to get a lot of 
information from her. 
Q Okay. You didn't get much information from her "though, 
did you? 
^ No, I did not get (Gammon depo. at 
v So you would have asked her [Plaintiff] her last name on 
more than one occasion? 
, V Correct. 
I) And Billy Rodd, you recollect, asked 
on more than one occasion? 
A. Right. 
Q. But you just couldn't get it from her? 
A. Correct. (Gammon depo. at 60-61). 
Q Your testimony before was that Sonya was not making any 
rational sense. 
THE WITNESS: All she was doing was mumbling some things. 
Q. Okay. And a lot of it wasn't an appropriate response to your 
questions? 
A. Correct. (Gammon depo. at 62). 
(Plaintiffs Memo f 19, pg. 6; trial transcript pg. 570). 
11. Statements given i fe that Plaintiff, at the time she was in the 
cusi pthe Stateline security officers, was in a "black-out" state. ("Gammon advised that 
Atkinson was "so drunk" that she was in a "black out state"), (Plaintiffs Memo JJJ \ pg u, 
trial transcript pg. 570). 
12. 1 in, Nlrtleliiu si i mi it»i officers allowed Mr. Owens into the security room. 
Security officer Gammon testified in his deposition: 
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A. John Doe did go up to Sonya and we were trying to calm her 
down and John Doe was trying to clam her down too, and that's 
when I tried to get John Doe to step back so I would clam her 
down and talk to her and find out where she was staying and if 
she was with anybody else. 
Q. Okay. 
A. But I was trying my best to get information and I couldn't 
get any information. 
Q. So you said you couldn't get any information from her. 
Why couldn't you get any information from Sonya? 
A. Because she was talking to John Doe and he was talking to 
her and we tried to - I actually tried breaking them up so we 
could get information. (Gammon depo. at 24-25). 
A. We tried - sat her down, we tried talking to her, asking her 
what's her name. 
Q. Did she respond when you said what's your name? 
A. She was actually being a little belligerent - well, I'm not 
saying belligerent, she was just being a little preoccupied, she 
was s- I can't explain it. She was just being just like 
everywhere else. (Gammon depo. at 58). 
(Defendants' Memo f 32, pg. 19-20; trial transcript pgs. 263-364). 
13. The Stateline security officers did not get important personal information from 
Plaintiff or Jay Owens prior to transporting Plaintiff to Jay Owens' room. 
Q. You're paying attention to me, so listen to the question. Did 
you ever ask John Doe what Sonya Atkinson's full name was? 
A. No." (Gammon depo. at 61). 
Q. Do you know why didn't he [sic] (Gammon) find out what 
her last name was? 
A. I have no idea why we didn't get a last name. But -." 
(Rodd depo. at 52). 
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(Plaintiffs Memo 1f2l, pg. 6-7; trial transcript pg. 570).2 
14. Gammon did not look in Plaintiffs purse for her identification or ask her for 
her identification because she was too intoxicated. 
Q. Okay. Could you have asked for permission to look in her 
purse? 
A. At that time we did not. 
Q. Okay. But you could have asked for permission? 
A. Well, we could have but she was too intoxicated. . ." 
(Gammon depo. at 68). 
(Plaintiffs Memo f22, pg. 7; trial transcript pg. 570). 
15. Security officer Gammon testified in his deposition: 
A. And we tried to get information from her, and John Doe [Jay 
Owens], and that's when she said she was, as I say in my report, 
that he said that they had a room in Motel 6". (Gammon depo. 
at 58). 
(Defendants' Memo f36, pg. 21, trial transcript pg. 569). 
16. Gammon's testimony conflicts about efforts to obtain the Plaintiff s personal 
information. First, Gammon testified that he did not ask Plaintiff her full name.3 (Gammon 
depo. at 30). On the second day of his deposition, six days later, Gammon testified that they 
tried to get information, including Plaintiff s last name, for over 15 minutes. (Gammon depo. 
at 60). 
2
 It is also important to observe that the Stateline security officers even failed to 
determine the identity of Mr. Owens as demonstrated by the fact that he is referred to only as 
"John Doe". 
3
 After answering the question about asking Plaintiff for her name, Gammon stated that he 
had to go to work, ended the deposition against the advice of counsel and continued it for six 
days later. 
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Defendant Robb testified in his deposition: 
A. Okay, what I did, okay, when we start removing or we take 
them or do anything of this nature, we ask them if they've got 
a hotel room here or at the Silver Smith. This was already taken 
care of. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Now, that - he gave - you know, he says, no, they don't 
have a hotel room there, and I said, do you have a hotel room 
anywhere in town? 
Q. And he said, but I do have a room at the Motel 6? 
A. Right. 
o. at 51; Defendants' Memo f36, pg. 21; trial transcript pg. 362). 
Defendant Gammon testified in his deposition: 
A. And we tried to get information from her, and John Doe, and 
that's when she said she was, as I say in my report, that he said 
that they had a room in Motel 6. 
Q. So you're referring to your report and you're saying John 
Doe told you that they had a room at Motel 6? 
A. Correct, and then she said yes, we have a room in Motel 6, 
so she-
depo. at58-59; Defendant's Memo 1J3 6, pgs. 21-22; trial transcript pgs. 360-361). 
Defendant Lee Singleton testified in his deposition: 
Q. Okay. So you remember her saying yes, that they had a 
room - she had a room someplace else; correct? 
A. Yeah. Well, as I recall, her statement was at the Motel 6, 
yes. 
Q. She said she had a room at the Motel 6? 
A. Yes. I think it was, yeah, at the Motel 6 was kind of roughly 
what she said. 
Q. Okay. She specifically named the Motel 6? 
A. Yes. 
Q. She didn't say the Westerner? 
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A. No. 
Q. Okay. And you're sure it was her voice and no one else's 
voice? 
A. It was definitely her voice. You get a room full of men and 
one woman, you can tell the woman's voice. 
(Singleton depo. at 44; Defendant's Memo |36, pg. 22; trial transcript pg. 361). 
20. Even though Plaintiff was unable to walk without assistance, unable to provide 
her name, and was in a "black-out state", the Stateline security officers elected to take 
Plaintiff to Mr. Owens' room at Motel 6. (Defendants' Memo f40, pg. 24; trial transcription 
pg. 359; Plaintiff's Memo 1f25, pg. 7; trial transcript pg. 369). 
21. Security officer Gammon testified that he carried Plaintiff to the Stateline van 
because Plaintiff was limp and dead weight. (Plaintiff's Memo f26, pg. 8; trial transcription 
pg. 568). 
22. While waiting for the Stateline van, Mr. Gammon testified that he put Plaintiff 
down and "her knees went out from under her and I caught her". Mr. Gammon then 
supported Plaintiff in that fashion until the van arrived. (Plaintiff's Memo |27, pg. 8; trial 
transcript pg. 568). 
23. Lee Duessen, a Wendover police officer, arrived at the Stateline and observed 
the Stateline security officers with Plaintiff. Officer Duessen followed the Stateline van 
when it transported Plaintiff to Mr. Owens' room at Motel 6. (Defendants' Memo f 45, pg. 
26; trial transcription pg. 357; Plaintiff's Memo f 28, pg. 8; trial transcript pg. 568). 
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24. When Plaintiff exited the Stateline van, followed closely by Mr. Gammon, 
Plaintiff began to go limp and Mr. Gammon caught her and carried her into Mr. Owens' 
room at Motel 6. 
Q. Okay. After the door was open, Sonya exited before you 
exited then? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And when she exited, you said she started to go limp again? 
A. Correct. 
Q. So before she fell, you caught her and when you caught her 
you put her in what you describe as a fireman's carry? 
A. Yes. (Gammon depo. at 98-99). 
(Defendants' Memo 1f47, pg. 26-27; trial transcript pg. 356-357). 
25. Gammon then deposited Plaintiff on the bed in Owens' room and he and 
Singleton left the motel. (Singleton depo. at 57-58; Plaintiff's Memo |38, pg. 10; trial 
transcript pg. 566). 
26. Jay Owens raped Plaintiff. Jay Owens testified that he pled guilty to raping 
Plaintiff. (Owens depo. at 60). (Plaintiff's Memo f 39, pg. 10; trial transcript pg. 566). 
27. Stateline security officers' written reports were created after they were 
informed of the alleged rape. 
Q. Okay. Which officer requested that you fill this report out? 
Was it Officer Trammell? 
A. I think it was Trammell. Yeah. 
Q. Okay. Did Trammell interview you? 
A. He just told us what the deal was, what had happened. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And had us fill out one of these." (Rodd depo. at 61). 
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Lee Singleton's report was written on April 14, 1995, five days after the incident. Mr. 
Gammon was informed of the alleged rape on April 10, 1996 and wrote the reports on the 
same date. (Plaintiffs Memo 1f40 pg. 10-11; trial transcript pgs. 565-566). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Defendants. Summary 
judgment was not appropriate because the witness statements are inconsistent, creating 
genuine issues of material fact to be decided by a jury at trial. 
Summary judgment was inappropriate since the issue of the duty of care by 
Defendants to Plaintiff created a genuine issue of fact to be determined by a jury at trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ENTRY OF A SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT 
A P P R O P R I A T E B E C A U S E THE 
INCONSISTENCY OF THE WITNESSES IN 
THEIR SWORN DEPOSITION TESTIMONY 
CREATES A MATERIAL ISSUE OF FACT. 
Plaintiff in her Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment disputed 
Defendants' Statements of Fact Nos. 13 and 15 because they mischaracterize when and 
where the Plaintiff and Jay Owens met. Plaintiff also disputed Defendants' Statements of 
Fact Nos. 31,36,39,44, and 45 to the extent that they quote and assume the complete truth 
and veracity of the statements quoted therein. (Plaintiffs Memo pg. 2; trial transcript pg. 
574). The statements, reports, and deposition testimony from witnesses are inconsistent to 
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the extent that the integrity of the statements may be questioned. Plaintiff contends that the 
veracity of the witnesses in this matter should be determined by the trier of fact and such 
determination is not appropriate for summary judgment dispQsition. 
As noted in the facts, Stateline security officers testified that Plaintiff was unable to 
walk into the Stateline security office without assistance, told the FBI that Plaintiff was in 
a "black-out state" while in the security office, was unable to speak except "gibberish" 
during relevant times, and was not even able to provide her name when repeatedly asked. 
Yet, according to the other testimony of Stateline employees, the Plaintiff told them she was 
with Mr. Owens and that she indicated she had a room at Motel 6. A finder of fact should 
be allowed to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
It has been held that "one sworn statement under oath [involving a material fact] is 
all that is necessary to create a factual issue, thereby precluding summary judgment". 
Nvman v. McDonald, 966 P.2d 1210, 1213 (Utah App. 1998); Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Schettler. 768 P. 2d 950, 957 (Utah App. 1989). Such sworn statements include deposition 
testimony that is before the trial court on summary judgment. Records v. Briggs. 887 P.2d 
864, 871 (Utah App. 1994). 
In the present case, the Defendants' agents' sworn deposition testimony is inconsistent 
and contradicts Plaintiff s deposition testimony. Plaintiff, in her Memorandum in Opposition 
to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment disputed several of the material facts alleged 
by Defendants. 
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As a matter of law, the summary judgment entered by the trial court should be 
reversed and the Plaintiff allowed to have her day in court. 
POINT n 
IT WAS IMPROPER FOR THE TRIAL COURT 
TO GRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR NEGLIGENCE. 
A. As a General Rule Issues of Negligence Ordinarily Present Questions of 
Fact to be Resolved by the Fact Finder. It is only when facts to be resolved by the fact finder 
are undisputed and but one reasonable conclusion can be drawn therefrom that such issues 
become questions of law. Apache Tank Lines. Inc. v. Cheney. 706 P.2d 614, 615 (Utah 
1985). 
Summary judgment should be granted with great caution in negligence cases. 
Williams v. Melby. 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985). In this case, as pointed out above, the facts 
are disputed and Plaintiff submits that a finder of fact could determine that Defendants were 
negligent when they delivered the Plaintiff, who was imdisputedly grossly inebriated in great 
part by the actions of the Defendant Stateline, to a hotel room at Motel 6 with an individual 
whom they failed to identify, where Plaintiff was subsequently beaten and raped. 
B. It was Inappropriate for the Trial Court to Grant Defendants' Summary 
Judgment on the Issue of Negligence. A party, to prevail on the issue of negligence, must 
prove: 
(1) That the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty; 
(2) That the defendant breached that duty; 
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(3) That the defendant's breach of the duty was the proximate cause of the 
injury; and 
(4) That there was in fact an injury. 
Reeves v. Gentile. 813 P.2d 111, 116 (Utah 1991). 
The Court found that the Stateline Defendants4 had no duty to protect Plaintiff under 
either the Restatement (Second) of Torts §233 or §344 "under these circumstances" absent 
evidence that the Defendants knew or should have known that an assault was about to occur. 
The trial court stated in its conclusion that to require the Stateline Defendants to assume that 
Plaintiff and Mr. Owens were not together and that an assault was about to occur based on 
his clothing or their different last names would "impose an unreasonable burden" on the 
Stateline Defendants and the Court concludes these Defendants had no such duty. The trial 
court continued, "Because there is no evidence that Defendants knew or should have known 
that an assault was about to occur, summary judgment is appropriate". (Summary Judgment, 
1f2; trial transcript pgs. 605-608). 
It has been held that where the evidence is in dispute, including the inferences from 
the evidence, the issue should be submitted to the jury. Harris v. Utah Transit Authority. 671 
P.2d 217, 220; Little America Refining Co. v. Levba. 641 P.2d 112 (Utah 1982); FMA 
Acceptance Co. v. Leatherbv Ins. Co., 594 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1979). 
4
 The "Stateline Defendants" include Stateline Hotel Casino & Resort, Franklin T. 
Gammon, O. Lee Singleton, and Billy R. Rodd. 
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The Supreme Court held in Harris: 
We do not mean to imply that rulings by the court which decide 
a factual contention of law are never appropriate. But the right 
to trial by jury is a basic principle of our system that cannot be 
allowed to be eroded by improper intrusions on the jury's 
prerogative. Id. at 220. 
The Stateline invites individuals to its establishment to stay, gamble, and drink. In 
fact, to entice patrons to stay and gamble the Stateline provides free alcoholic beverages to 
patrons and, in this case, the facts are not disputed that Stateline provided Plaintiff at least 
16 free alcoholic beverages in addition to other alcoholic drinks which she consumed in a 
6 or 7 hour period. 
A jury should be allowed to determine from the facts and the inferences from those 
facts whether the Stateline Defendants had a duty, after providing sufficient alcohol to render 
Plaintiff in a "black-out state", to not deliver Plaintiff to a man's hotel room whom they had 
not even bothered to identify when there is an issue of whether Plaintiff could consent to the 
Stateline Defendant's actions in her inebriated condition. 
Owners of land must exercise due care and prudence for the safety of business 
invitees. Dwiggins v. Morgan Jewelers, 811 P.2d 182,183 (Utah 1991): Long v Smith Food 
King Store. 531 P.2d 360,362 (Utah 1973). The Restatement (Second) of Torts §344 (1965) 
recognizes that a business owner also has a duty to protect its customers from criminal acts 
by third parties. Section 344 states: 
Business Premises Open to Public: Acts of Third Persons or 
Animals: 
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A possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry for 
his business purposes is subject to liability to members of the 
public while they are upon the land for such a purpose, for 
physical harm caused by the accidental, negligent, or 
intentionally harmful acts of third persons or animals, and by 
the failure of the possessor to exercise reasonable care to 
(a) discover that such acts are being done or are likely to be 
done, o r . . . 
. . . the possessor "is ordinarily under no duty to exercise any 
care until he knows or has reason to know that the acts of the 
third person are occurring, or are about to occur. 
Utah follows the Restatement and has held that this duty exists in Utah, but recognizes 
that the duty does not arise until the business owner knows, or should know, that criminal 
acts are likely to occur. Dwiggins at 183. 
In Dwiggins. the Court held that the facts failed to establish the requisite level of 
foreseeability. The Court held that Morgan Jewelers did not have reason to know that the 
store was about to be robbed. In this case, the Stateline Defendants provided sufficient 
alcohol to render Plaintiff unable to walk without assistance, unable to answer simple 
questions, and unable to even provide her name. A finder of fact could reasonably find it 
foreseeable that by delivering Plaintiff, a young woman who was in a "black-out state" to a 
hotel room of a man, whom the Stateline Defendants did not bother to identify or confirm 
was with Plaintiff, could place the Plaintiff in danger of physical injury. Plaintiff certainly 
could raise the issue of foreseeable harm, and that determination should be left for resolution 
by a finder of fact. 
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Plaintiff also submits that there is an issue as to whether the Stateline exercised 
reasonable care to discover if harm to Plaintiff would be likely considering the facts. This 
is also a material issue of fact which a jury should be allowed to decide. 
The trial court also ruled in its Summary Judgment that the Stateline Defendants had 
no duty to protect the Plaintiff under Restatement (Second) of Torts §323. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §323 (1965) provides as follows: 
One who undertakes gratuitously or for consideration, to render 
services to another which he should recognize as necessary for 
the protection of the other's person or things, is subject to 
liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure 
to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if (a) his 
failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or 
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the 
undertaking. (Emphasis added). 
In this case, Plaintiff was intoxicated to the point that it was necessary for two 
security guards, each holding one of Plaintiffs arms, to escort her to the security office. 
Plaintiff became at least partially incapacitated by consuming drinks gratuitously served by 
Stateline. It was not clear if any relationship actually existed between Plaintiff and Mr. 
Owens. Whether Stateline had a heightened duty to protect the incapacitated Plaintiff against 
another patron where Stateline was at least partially responsible for Plaintiff s incapacitation 
and where the casino industry may invite criminal or assaultive activity should be a question 
for the jury and should not be decided as a matter of law. 
The Restatement at §324 also contains a provision which applies when a person takes 
charge of another who is "helpless": 
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One who, being under no duty to do so, takes charge of another 
who is helpless adequately to aid or protect himself is subject to 
liability to the other for any bodily harm caused by him by (a) 
the failure of the actor to exercise reasonable care to secure the 
safety of the other while within the actor's charge, or (b) the 
actor's discontinuing his aid and protection, if by doing so he 
leaves the other in a worse position than when the actor took 
charge of him. (Emphasis added). 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §324 (1965).5 
This latter provision applies where "the actor takes charge of one who is ill, drunk, 
or made helpless by the act of a third person or a force of nature". Id comment (b). The 
comments to §324 provide that a person owes a lesser duty to another when rendering 
gratuitous services than if compensation were sought: 
The care which the actor must exercise is only that which the 
recipient of gratuitous services is entitled to expect. Thus, the 
actor is not required to conform to a high standard of diligence 
and competence, to possess any special skill, or to subordinate 
his own interests to those of the other, or to the same extent as 
would be necessary if the services were obligatory or for 
compensation. Id comment (d). 
In this case, the Stateline had at least a duty, if not a heightened duty, to protect 
Plaintiff since it undisputedly participated in acts which rendered the Plaintiff incapacitated. 
The security officers at the Stateline took control of Plaintiff and did so recognizing that she 
was incapacitated and that there was a need to protect Plaintiff. 
5
 As noted in the Comment, the distinction between §323 and §324 is that in the latter, 
c
*the plaintiff is in a helpless position, which is an important factor in determining whether the 
actor may discontinue the aid or protection he has undertaken to give". Id comment (a). 
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There clearly is an issue of fact as to whether the Stateline Defendants "exercised 
reasonable care" under the circumstances. Placing Plaintiff, a young woman, in the hotel 
room with a man whom the Stateline Defendants had not even bothered to identify, and when 
the Stateline Defendants had taken precious little, if any, effort to determine if Plaintiff was 
with Mr. Owens, placed Plaintiff in reasonably foreseeable jeopardy of serious harm. A jury 
should be allowed to determine if the Stateline Defendants' conduct was reasonable and 
whether the Stateline Defendants' conduct placed Plaintiff at risk. 
C. The Stateline Defendants Breached their Duty to Plaintiff. In this case, 
security officers employed by the Defendant Stateline failed to investigate the identity of the 
person claiming to be Plaintiff's companion to the extent necessary to protect Plaintiff from 
the injury she suffered as a consequence. Defendant Stateline argues that it did not breach 
its duty to Plaintiff because the security officers inquired as to whether Mr. Owens was 
Plaintiff s companion. Whether Plaintiff actually stated that Mr. Owens was her companion, 
and whether Plaintiffs intoxicated condition should have been taken into account are 
genuine issues of material fact in determining whether Defendant Stateline breached a duty 
owed to Plaintiff. These issues of material fact preclude entry of summary judgment. 
The common law recognizes a duty of due care on the part of an individual or entity 
that undertakes, whether gratuitously or for consideration, to perform the duty. Breach of 
that duty may result in an actionable tort. Nelson bv and through Stockman v. Salt Lake 
City. 919 P.2d 568, 573 (Utah 1996). Where one undertakes an act which he has no duty 
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to perform and another relies upon that undertaking, the act must be performed in ordinary 
and reasonable care. Nelson at 573; AmJur 2d Negligence §208 at 255 (1989). 
The question as to whether the Stateline Defendants acted reasonably or breached 
their legal duty is an issue which should be decided by a jury. Harris v. Utah Transit 
Authority. 671 P.2d217,220 (Utah 1982); Kitchen v. Cal. Gas Co.. Inc.. 821 P.2d458 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
D. The Breach of Duty of the Stateline Defendants was the Proximate Cause 
of Plaintiffs Injury. The breach of the duty must be the proximate cause of an injury. 
Kitchen at 451: Steffensen v. Smith's Mgt. Corp.. 820 P.2d 482.485 (Utah App. 1991). The 
standard definition of proximate cause is: 
[tjhat cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, 
(unbroken by an efficient intervening cause), produces the 
injury and without which the result would not have occurred. 
It is the efficient cause - the one that necessarily sets in 
operation the factors that accomplish the injury. 
Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises. 697 P.2d 240,246 (Utah 1985); State v. Lawson. 688 P.2d 
479, 482 (1984); Watters v. Ouerrv. 626 P.2d 455, 460 (Utah 1981). In this case, the 
Stateline Defendants' failure to confirm Plaintiffs relationship with Mr. Owens before 
delivering her to his room was the direct cause of Plaintiffs injury. 
E. Plaintiff was Injured bv the Stateline Defendants. The final element to be 
proven to establish negligence is that there was in fact injury. Kitchen v. Cal. Gas Co.. Inc.. 
821 P.2d 458,461 (Utah App. 1991). There is no question that Plaintiff was raped by Mr. 
Owens after Plaintiff was taken to Mr. Owens' room at Motel 6 by the Stateline Defendants. 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff sued the Stateline Defendants on the basis of negligence. The record of this 
case, including the depositions and pleadings, demonstrate there is a genuine issue as to 
material facts concerning whether the Stateline Defendants were negligent. A trial court may 
not grant summary judgment and thereby deny a party a trial on negligence issues, including 
resolving the appropriate standard of care unless a jury could not conclude that the Stateline 
Defendants' conduct was not negligent. Wvcalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 821 
(Utah App. 1989), cert denied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1989). 
In this case, a jury could conclude from the undisputed evidence and facts that the 
Stateline Defendants were negligent. 
The summary judgment should be reversed and this case remanded for a trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this £3 day of May, 2000. 
ROBERTA. HUGHES 
JOHN F. BATES 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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APPENDIX 1 
STEPHEN G. MORGAN, No. 231 
JOSEPH E. MINNOCK, No. 6281 
MORGAN, MEYER & RICE 
136 South Main Street, Eighth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone (801) 531-7888 
Fax (801) 531-9732 
Attorneys for Defendants Stateline Hotel 
Casino & Resort, Franklin Gammon, 0. Lee 
Singleton, and Billy R. Rodd 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SONYA L. ATKINSON, 
: SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
STATELINE HOTEL CASINO & RESORT, : 
FRANKLIN T. GAMMON, O. LEE : 
SINGLETON, BILLY R. RODD, JAY : 
OWENS, and JOHN DOES : Civil No. 950300048 
SECURITY OFFICERS #1-30, : 
Honorable L.A. Dever 
Defendants. : 
On October 19, 1998, the Court heard oral arguments on the motion for summary 
judgment filed by Defendants State Line Hotel Casino and Resort, Franklin T. Gammon, O. Lee 
Singleton, and Billy R. Rodd. Robert C. Miner appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff. Stephen G. 
r - r-
{"'LED r .'. V ' 
.'?•• 12 
Morgan appeared on behalf of the Defendants. After the hearing, the Court took the matter under 
advisement. The Court has now considered the memoranda submitted by the parties, and the 
arguments of counsel, the Court concludes as follows: 
1. The Court concludes that there are no genuine issues of material fact warranting trial of 
this matter with respect to these Defendants. 
2. The Court finds that these Defendants would have no duty to protect the Plaintiff under 
either Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 323 or 344 under these circumstances absent 
evidence that these Defendants knew or should have known that an assault was about to occur. 
The Court concludes that to require these Defendants to assume that the Plaintiff and Mr. Owens 
were not together and that an assault was about to occur based on his clothing or their different 
last names would impose an unreasonable burden on the Defendants and the Court concludes 
these Defendants had no such duty. Because there is no evidence that Defendant knew or should 
have known that an assault was about to occur, summary judgment is appropriate for Defendants 
on the First Cause of Action. 
3. The Court concludes that the Fifth Cause of Action alleging defamation must be 
dismissed on the grounds that there is no evidence that the statements made by Defendants 
Gammon, Singleton and Rodd were untrue, and said statements which were made to a police 
officer were given in the context of judicial proceedings and are, therefore, subject to a qualified 
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privilege. The Plaintiff has not presented evidence which would permit a finder of fact to 
conclude that the Defendants' statements were not protected by the qualified privilege. 
4. The Court concludes that the Sixth Cause of Action for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress must be dismissed because there is no evidence from which a fact-finder 
could conclude that these Defendants' acts were outrageous and intolerable. The Plaintiff has not 
presented evidence that these Defendants knew or should have known that Mr. Owens was going 
to assault the Plaintiff or that she did not want to accompany Mr. Owens. There is also no 
evidence that these Defendants intended emotional harm to the Plaintiff. 
5. The Court concludes that there is no evidence by which a reasonable fact-finder could 
conclude by clear and convincing evidence that these Defendants acted either intentionally or 
with reckless disregard for the rights of the Plaintiff. Therefore, the Court concludes that there is 
no evidence to support a claim for punitive damages. 
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that summary judgment be entered in 
favor of Defendants State Line Hotel Casino and Resort, Billy R. Rodd, O. Lee Singleton, and 
Franklin Todd Gammon. 
DATED this  j day o Hq999. 
BY THE COURT: 
Hono1 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FO 
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. Rasmussen 
fert C. Miner 
ttorneys for Plaintiff 
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